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  21 Introduction
The contract theory literature has studied, in depth, how asymmetric information a⁄ects
the relationship between a principal and an agent. Most of this literature has focused
on isolated pairs of hierarchies, where the principal is a monopolist and the optimal
contract will give some rents in excess of the reservation utility to ensure revelation and
optimally solve a trade-o⁄between incentives and e¢ ciency by allowing some distortions
away from the ￿rst-best (see for example Baron and Myerson [1982] or Stiglitz [1977]).
A smaller branch of the literature has focused on principal-agent pairs, who act in
a perfectly competitive market, where the zero-pro￿t condition plays a role, but the
principal makes his optimal choice of contract without external strategic element (see
Rotschild and Stiglitz [1976]). Surprisingly, less has been done to analyze the e⁄ect of
imperfect competition on incentives provision and most of the literature has focused
on models with moral-hazard (see Hart [1983]). The aim of this paper is to study the
optimal contracts, chosen by duopolists, in an hidden-information screening model.
We consider a two-stage model where, in the ￿rst stage, ￿rm owners choose contracts
for their managers, aiming to provide incentives to undertake e⁄ort in cost reducing
activities; in the second stage, once uncertainty on contracts, e⁄orts and costs has been
resolved, ￿rms engage in some form of product market competition. In our baseline
model, we focus on quantity competition with substitutable goods, where the e⁄orts
of the two managers are strategic substitutes, in the sense that a higher e⁄ort by one
reduces the marginal pro￿tability of e⁄ort of the other ￿rm. Managers di⁄er in their
disutility of e⁄ort and their types are independently distributed.
We ￿rst consider a ￿rst-best benchmark case of contract competition under uncer-
tainty where the productivity of an agent can be observed by his principal but not by
the rival. We assume a Nash behavior in the contract o⁄er, that is, e⁄ort/wage pairs are
chosen simultaneously, taking as given those o⁄ered by the other ￿rm. The uncertainty
about the manager￿ s type in the rival hierarchy produces by itself a strategic e⁄ect that
makes interdependent the optimal level of e⁄orts for the di⁄erent types (this is due to
the fact that the marginal bene￿t of e⁄ort di⁄ers, not only with one￿ s own manager￿ s
type, but also with the rival manager￿ s type1). Once we move to the asymmetric infor-
mation setup, where each agent￿ s type is private information to him, we observe that the
informational rent paid to high types, coupled with the strategic e⁄ect of the competing
contract, eliminates the ￿no distortion at the top￿property and a ￿two-way￿distortion
1In our companion paper, Etro and Cella [2010], the analysis is extended to a continuum of types
and n-￿rms and we show that the optimal level of e⁄ort for each type depends on the whole distribution
of types.
1becomes optimal. In other words, the equilibrium screening contract prescribes a level
of e⁄ort in excess of the ￿rst-best level for e¢ cient managers and one below the ￿rst
best level for ine¢ cient managers.
The ￿two-way￿distortion is robust to all our extensions, where e⁄ort levels are strate-
gic substitutes: when types are imperfectly correlated, when contracts between ￿rms and
managers include quantity commitments, and when ￿rms produce di⁄erentiated goods
and compete in prices rather than in quantities. The strategic interaction in the choice
of contracts leads ￿rms to polarize their requests from di⁄erent types, with higher e⁄ort
asked to the good managers (more likely to face bad ones) and vice-versa. However, in
those extensions where e⁄orts are strategic complements their equilibrium levels will be
downward distorted with respect to the ￿rst best for all types: this happens in case of
complement goods produced by the ￿rms or in case of investments in advertising which
enhances demand. Therefore, the kind of strategic interactions between the e⁄orts of
the managers (and not the kind of competition) leads to di⁄erent consequences on the
equilibrium contracts.
This work belongs to the branch of literature that studies the in￿ uence of competition
on incentive mechanisms. Most of the studies have focused on the issue of moral hazard
and have shown how competition reduces pro￿ts and, therefore, the marginal bene￿ts
of e⁄ort. Raith [2003] identi￿es this e⁄ect, together with a positive e⁄ect on incentives
coming from an increase in demand elasticity due to competition. This scale e⁄ect
is present also in most hidden information models, e.g. Martin [1993]2 that ￿nds a
negative e⁄ect of competition on e⁄orts due to a scale e⁄ect. Schmidt [1997] studies cost
reduction, within a moral hazard framework and a very stylized market game, where he
observes that the value of cost reduction depends on the e¢ ciency of the other duopolist,
exactly like in our model.
Some hidden information models have analyzed a setting where duopolists engage in
price discrimination, generating problems of common agency (see Ivaldi and Martimort
[1994]) within a signi￿cantly di⁄erent context than ours. The most relevant article on
screening within an oligopolistic framework is Martimort [1996], that compares the prof-
itability of exclusive dealing versus a common retailer (a problem of common agency).
To analyze the exclusive dealing case, the author develops a model that allows the analy-
sis of competition through secret contracts. His main ￿nding is a competing contract
e⁄ect, that reduces the distortion generated by the standard rent-extraction/e¢ ciency
trade-o⁄ when goods are substitutes. In his model, the contract o⁄ered by the rival ￿rm
a⁄ects the agent￿ s incentive constraints directly, therefore modifying the marginal cost
2Bertoletti and Poletti [1996] is extremely useful in understanding Martin￿ s result.
2of inducing e⁄ort. In our model, the rival ￿rm￿ s contract a⁄ects the objective function
of the principal directly and modi￿es the marginal bene￿t of e⁄ort. A similar result
is obtained by Brainard and Martimort [1996], that considers the e⁄ect of asymmetric
information on strategic trade policy, where principal agent hierarchies compete through
public contracts. We also have public contracts, but in their framework private infor-
mation is perfectly correlated. Recently, Piccolo, D￿ Amato and Martina [2008] have
studied the relationship between product market competition and organizational slack,
under di⁄erent contractual regimes. Assuming perfectly correlated types, when con-
tracts are conditioned on costs, competition has no e⁄ect on the ￿rms￿internal agency
problem. In that case, incentives are in fact independent from the rival￿ s performance
and only a scale e⁄ect is present. They also show that, if pro￿ts are used to control
managerial behavior, then competition has a direct impact on managers￿incentives. A
competing-contract e⁄ect (as in Martimort [1996]) mitigates the agency con￿ ict. All
the three papers above show that, however mitigated by competition the agency con-
￿ ict inside the hierarchy is solved in a familiar way, with no distortion at the top and
downward distortions for all but the most e¢ cient types.
Our ￿ndings may be reminiscent of the countervailing incentives literature (see Lewis
and Sappington [1989] and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [1995 ] where an agent￿ s incentive
to overreport or underreport depend on his type. In our model an agent has always
an incentive to overreport his disutility from e⁄ort.3 Two-way distortion makes an
appearance also in a principal multi-agent model in Lockwood [2000] due to a production
externality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and assumptions.
Section 3 analyzes two benchmarks. Section 4 presents our ￿rst best solution. Section
5 contains the main result. Section 6 extend to the case of positive correlation. Section
7 uses more comprehensive contracts. Section 8 studies the case of complement goods.
Section 9 presents two further extensions. Section 10 concludes.
2 The model
Consider two ￿rms, i and j; that operate in a market with inverse demand p = a ￿ X,
where X is total quantity produced and a is a size parameter. Production requires a
constant marginal cost which can be reduced by a manager￿ s e⁄ort. For simplicity, we
3More importantly, our two way distortion disappears if we consider a hierarchy in isolation as we go
back to a more standard monopolistic screening framework.
3assume that e⁄ort e generates the marginal cost c(e) = c ￿
p
e:4
The manager￿ s utility function is:
u(w;e) = w ￿ ￿ke, (1)
where ￿k, with k = 1;2, is the marginal disutility of e⁄ort of the manager. It is privately
known and is a random variable with discrete support [￿1;￿2] with 0 < ￿1 < ￿2; ￿￿ =
￿2 ￿ ￿1 and Pr(￿ = ￿1) = ￿. We make the further assumption that that ￿ is i.i.d across
managers.
E⁄ort and its disutility are not observable while realized marginal costs are veri￿-
able (by own principal), these assumptions place our analysis in a traditional screening
framework.
Firm owners o⁄er a contract to their respective managers to induce cost reducing
e⁄ort. A contract establishes the size of cost reduction, or equivalently the e⁄ort e, and
a wage w.
When o⁄ering the contract, each ￿rms takes the contract o⁄ered by the rival ￿rm
as given. In our setting a contract ensures participation and truthful revelation by the
manager but it is also a best response to the cost reducing activity that the other ￿rm
does through her own contract.
Contract o⁄ers are made simultaneously and realized costs become observable (but
not veri￿able) by everybody at the end of the ￿rst period. This modelling assumption
has two consequences: ￿rst of all, second stage product competition happens in a world
without uncertainty5 and, second, contracts are, in a way, necessarily incomplete in the
sense that one ￿rm cannot condition his own contract on the type of the other ￿rm￿ s
manager.6
The timing of our game is as follows:




2. Both ￿rms invest in cost reduction by o⁄ering a contract to their managers;
3. Managers accept or reject the contract;
4. Managers report their own type (choose a wage/e⁄ort pair);
5. Investments and payment take place;
4None of our qualitative results depend on the functional form of the cost function, that could be easily
generalized to C(￿;e) with Ce > 0, Cee ￿ 0, C￿ > 0 and Ce￿ > 0, the latter being the Spence-Mirrlees
condition.
5This makes our analysis more tractable analytically, but our qualitative results would not change if
contracts and costs remained secret.
6This contracting limitation may be due to problems of veri￿ability on the other ￿rm￿ s costs for lack
of auditing rights and abilities (see Brainard and Martimort [1996])
46. Marginal costs become public;
7. Firms compete ￿ la Cournot in the product market.
3 Benchmarks
This section brie￿ y presents some benchmark solutions: the monopoly case and the full
information Cournot model.
3.1 The monopolist solution.
At the second stage of product market competition a pro￿t maximizing monopolist will
produce xM = [a ￿ c +
p
e]=2 and obtain pro￿ts equal to ￿M = [a ￿ c +
p
e]2=4 ￿ w. If
the manager has no private information about his type, the ￿rm owner will choose the
contract (e￿M;w￿M) that maximizes pro￿ts under the participation constraint w￿M =
￿ke￿M. The ￿rst best contract requires
q
e￿M
k = (a ￿ c)=(4￿k ￿ 1). This e⁄ort is also the
one that minimizes total costs (e⁄ort provision and production costs) at the monopoly
output7.
In the case of private information the principal/owner will have to satisfy incentive
compatibility constraints to ensure truthtelling from the manager/agent. Informational
rents for the most e¢ cient type of manager will require downward distortion in the
level of e⁄ort required to the less e¢ cient manager, namely
q
eM













. This is the well known result of standard
screening models, the most e¢ cient manager will have to exert an e¢ cient level of e⁄ort
(the ￿no distortion at the top￿property) while any other type￿ s e⁄ort is reduced below
the ￿rst best level.
3.2 The Cournot solution.
We now present the analysis of a duopoly in which two ￿rms i and j choose their contracts
to maximize pro￿ts under a participation constraint for their managers and taking as
given the contracts of each other, there is no private information and the managers￿
types are common knowledge. Given two contracts (ei;wi) and (ej;wj), at the second
stage of product competition, ￿rm i obtains the following pro￿ts:






xi ￿ wi (2)
7If total costs are TC (￿;x;e) = (c ￿
p







5In a Cournot equilibrium each duopolist produces:
xi =







and the equilibrium price is:
p =







Accordingly, the ￿rst stage pro￿ts of ￿rm i can be expressed as












and the optimal contract maximizes these pro￿ts under the participation constraint





eiej < 0 (7)
therefore a higher e⁄ort by one manager reduces the marginal pro￿tability of e⁄ort for
the other ￿rm.
When both managers are of type ￿, the optimal contract of ￿rm i must satisfy
the condition
p
ei = 2(a ￿ c ￿
p
ej)=(9￿ ￿ 4), and the same condition holds for the
other ￿rm. The symmetric Nash equilibrium levels of e⁄ort required will be
p
e￿ =
2(a ￿ c)=(9￿ ￿ 2), which is lower than the one under monopoly. As it is well known,
competition reduces prices and pro￿ts, but does not increase e⁄ort. This is due to a
scale e⁄ect (see for example Martin [1993]) caused by the fact that in a duopoly model
each ￿rm is facing a lower residual demand and the marginal bene￿t of e⁄ort is smaller.
It is worth noting that although e⁄ort decreases it is still higher than the level that
would minimize total costs. The reason is to be found in the Cournot type of competition
coupled with the two stages set-up, as pointed out by Brander and Spencer [1983]. They
show that, when investment in cost reduction is made before the associated output is
produced, ￿rms tend to shift resources to the ￿rst stage so that marginal costs are lower
and they can gain an advantage in the imperfectly competitive output game.
6This simple model of contract competition in presence of identical managers can
be extended in many ways by altering the informational structure. In the subsequent
sections we will make the assumption that the types of the managers are independently
distributed. This setup will allow us to study how a principal will modify his contract
o⁄er when he knows his rival will adopt a similar behavior in presence of manager￿ s
speci￿c shocks.8
4 Contract competition with symmetric information
We now assume that, at the contract o⁄er stage, each ￿rm knows the type of its own
manager but not that of the other ￿rm, and can condition its contract only on the former.
In other words, there is uncertainty on the type of the other ￿rm￿ s manager, but there
is no asymmetric information in this framework. We can consider the contracts o⁄ered
in this setup as the ￿rst best benchmark of our oligopolistic screening framework.
Contracts are chosen simultaneously taking as given those o⁄ered by the other ￿rm.
At the second stage, uncertainty is resolved and production decisions take place simul-
taneously knowing the true realized costs of each ￿rm.
We solve the game by backward induction. Given two contracts (ei;wi) and (ej;wj),
the two ￿rms produce as in (3) and obtain pro￿ts as in (6).
The optimal contract, (ei
k;wi
k), for each ￿rm i and with a manager of type k, will
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k with k = 1;2
The above expectation is just an average of the pro￿ts earned when competing with
a rival who employs an e¢ cient or ine¢ cient manager. The participation constraint is
binding and the optimal e⁄ort of a manager of type ￿k in ￿rm i satis￿es the following
￿rst order condition:

















j;k = 1;2 and j 6= i (9)
The following Proposition characterizes the symmetric equilibrium of our model.
Proposition 1 When each principal can observe the type of his own manager the opti-

































2 , implying that competition leads to a polarization of
equilibrium e⁄orts.
Proof. Taking (9) and imposing symmetry gives immediately the two equilibrium con-





2(a ￿ c)(9￿z ￿ 4)
(9￿1 + 2￿ ￿ 4)(9￿2 ￿ 2￿ ￿ 2) ￿ 4￿(1 ￿ ￿)
for k;z = 1;2 and k 6= z (12)




2 = (9￿2 ￿ 4)=(9￿1 ￿ 4) that is unambiguously higher




2 = (4￿2 ￿ 1)=(4￿1 ￿ 1):
Competition generates a tendency toward polarization of e⁄orts. To see how this
happens, notice that in general ￿rms induce a high e⁄ort when they have an e¢ cient
manager because the marginal return of e⁄ort is higher, this return is even larger when
the probability of meeting an ine¢ cient rival is high (￿ is low). They, instead, induce
a very low e⁄ort when they have an ine¢ cient manager, especially if they are likely to
meet an e¢ cient rival (￿ is high). Competition increases the distance between the two
equilibrium contracts because a lower e⁄ort of the ine¢ cient rival increases the incentives
to exert e⁄ort for an e¢ cient manager - see (10). Moreover, a higher e⁄ort of the e¢ cient
rival leads to a reduction of the e⁄ort of an ine¢ cient manager - see (11) - because it
reduces the marginal return from e⁄ort, especially when facing a more e¢ cient rival.
Therefore, competition with uncertainty on the rivals￿types leads to an increase in the
8ratio between the e⁄ort required from an e¢ cient manager and that required from an
ine¢ cient manager.
In this setup where there is no asymmetric information inside the hierarchy we al-
ready observe an e⁄ect of the strategic interaction in the product market on the provision
of incentives. The commitment e⁄ect of deciding costs at the ￿rst stage coupled with the
strategic e⁄ect of the other hierarchy￿ s contract o⁄er modi￿es even further the marginal
bene￿t on inducing e⁄ort.
In other words, competition in the product market leads the principal to o⁄er con-
tracts that are also a best response to the contractual behavior of the other principal, this
strategic element produces optimal e⁄orts whose ratio is higher than in the monopoly
setting.
This strategic e⁄ect can be so large to completely reverse the scale e⁄ect we have
observed in our benchmark Cournot model. One can, in fact, verify that the e⁄ort
required from the e¢ cient manager can be larger, in absolute value, than the one required
by a monopolist with a manager of the same type,
q
eM
1 = (a ￿ c)=(4￿1 ￿ 1):9 However,




1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
p
e￿
2 is larger under duopoly compared to the average e⁄ort under
monopoly.10 In other words, when managers are more likely to be ine¢ cient, competition
induces ￿rms with e¢ cient managers to exert more e⁄ort than if they were monopolists,
and when the productivity di⁄erential is large enough competition increases the average
e⁄ort as well.
This increase in e⁄ort has the obvious direct consequence of reducing marginal pro-
duction costs and having more ￿aggressive￿￿rms compete in the product market. Over-
all this is still far from saying that ￿rms increase their e¢ ciency, if with that we mean
operating at the minimum of total costs. Since e⁄ort is remunerated at the ￿rst stage
(and then those costs are sunk at the second one), there is a built in tendency to have
the manager exert too much cost reducing activity. To put it simply ￿rms are prone to
be ine¢ cient because they put too much e⁄ort, not too little. Consumers obviously gain
from this type of ine¢ ciency.





1 if ￿1 < 1 and ￿2 > 5￿1=9(1 ￿ ￿1).













2 = 1=65 and the average e⁄ort is 0.3 in monopoly and 0.34 in duopoly.
95 Contract competition with asymmetric information
In this section we make the assumption that managers have private information about
their cost reduction ability. When o⁄ering a contract each principal will optimally screen
for its own manager￿ s type and will take as given the optimal contractual behavior of
the rival ￿rm.11 Since the second stage product market competition is una⁄ected the
optimal quantity is still given by (3) and pro￿ts take the form of (6).
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k) is the contract chosen by ￿rm i for its manager of type ￿k with k =
1;2. The ￿rst pair of constraints ensure participation while second one will guarantee
truthtelling. Standard arguments imply that the binding constraints are the partici-
pation constraint for the ine¢ cient manager and the incentive compatibility constraint











Using these constraints, the optimal contract for ￿rm i with a manager of type ￿k satis￿es
11As mentioned before we assume that ￿rm i￿ s contract cannot be conditioned on the type of the
manager of ￿rm j.
12We will check later that the solution is monotonic, that will guarantee global incentive compatibility.
There is no need for a modi￿ed monotonicity condition as in Piccolo et al. [2008] because incentives
constraint are not modi￿ed by contract competition.
















9~ ￿k ￿ 4
(15)
where ~ ￿1 = ￿1 and ~ ￿2 = ￿2 + v
1￿v￿￿. In a symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
the choice of contracts, it must be that both ￿rms choose the same contracts (e1;w1) =
(e1;￿1e1 + ￿￿e2) and (e2;w2) = (e2;￿2e2).
We can now characterize our equilibrium screening contracts.
Proposition 2 When managers have private information about their type the optimal
























+ 2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 4
(17)
Moreover e1 > e￿
1 and e2 < e￿
2; meaning that both types exert ine¢ cient levels of e⁄orts.
Proof. Taking (15) and imposing symmetry gives immediately the two equilibrium






9~ ￿z ￿ 4
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￿ 2￿ ￿ 2
i
￿ 4￿(1 ￿ ￿)
for k;z = 1;2 and k 6= z
(18)
and where ~ ￿1 = ￿1 and ~ ￿2 = ￿2 + v
1￿v￿￿.
Then note that (16) is the same as (10) while (17) is di⁄erent from (11) because at
the denominator we have the virtual type of the ine¢ cient manager. As a consequence
the second best value for e2 will be lower than the ￿rst best case while e1 will be higher.
This has shown a crucial feature of contract competition and oligopolistic screening:
contrary to what happens in the case of monopolistic screening, the equilibrium e⁄ort
of the e¢ cient manager depends on the equilibrium e⁄ort of the ine¢ cient one and,
when informational rents have to be paid to ensure revelation, the no distortion at
the top property disappears. The strategic e⁄ect discussed previously and asymmetric
11information within the hierarchy imply that the contract requires ine¢ cient e⁄orts from
both, with e¢ cient managers asked to provide more e⁄ort than in the ￿rst best (e1 >
e￿
1) and ine¢ cient ones asked to provide less (e2 < e￿
2). This brings to an additional
polarization of the e⁄ort levels. The fact that a ￿rm provides low incentives to an
ine¢ cient manager to insure incentive compatibility forces the other ￿rm to require extra
e⁄ort from the e¢ cient manager to exploit the higher return from e⁄ort (especially in
case the rival is ine¢ cient). In turn, stronger incentives for the e¢ cient managers reduce
the marginal return of e⁄ort of the ine¢ cient rivals even further. The two mechanisms
reinforce each other due to the strategic element in the contracts choice.
In conclusion, asymmetric information increases the equilibrium e⁄ort of the e¢ cient
manager, while reducing his informational rent, and reduces the equilibrium e⁄ort of the
ine¢ cient manager.
This has immediate implications for the ￿strength￿of the incentive contracts, which
can be measured through the ratio between di⁄erent e⁄orts or, equivalently, with the






























2 and as it was the case in the previous section, the e⁄ort required from the
e¢ cient manager can be larger in absolute value than the one required by a monopolist.13
This example also grants us the possibility of looking at the consequences of contract
competition on the market structure, namely on pro￿ts and prices. Denoting with ￿ij
the gross pro￿ts of a ￿rm with a manager of type i competing against one with a manager
of type j, from (6) we have the following ￿nal gross pro￿ts:
￿12 =
￿































Asymmetric information de￿nitely increases the volatility of the gross pro￿ts, because
e1 (e2) goes up (down) compared to e￿
1 (e￿
2). However, results are less clear-cut for the
net pro￿ts.
We can also look at the equilibrium price that is always given by (4) depending on
13Again, this happens for ￿ and ￿1 small enough and ￿2 large enough, and when ￿2 is high enough
also the average e⁄ort is larger under duopoly compared to the monopoly with asymmetric information.
12the types of the managers, with an expected value given by:
E￿[p] =
a + 2(c ￿ ￿
p





It is easy to verify that asymmetric information reduces the expected price (the weighted
e⁄ort goes down when we introduce a distortion), but price dispersion increases. On one
side asymmetric information leads to a price reduction in case of two e¢ cient managers
compared to the outcome without asymmetric information: the corresponding price






goes down since e1 goes up compared to e￿
1. The opposite
occurs in case of two ine¢ cient managers, since asymmetric information gives rise to






goes up. The mixed cases
in which one ￿rm only has an e¢ cient manager produces an ambiguous price change








=3). However, when ￿ = 1=2 this price is the same
as the expected price and in such a case we can conclude that price volatility increases
because of asymmetric information.
6 Correlated types
In this section we extend the basic duopolistic model to generally correlated types. The
main ￿nding is that negative correlation tends to enhance polarization of the e⁄ort levels
of high and low productivity managers, while positive correlation tends to reduce the
polarization. In the limit case of perfect correlation we return to the no-distortion at
the top result, as in Martimort (1996).
The intuition for the latter result is pretty straightforward: if correlation is perfect,
the principal, when o⁄ering a contract, knows that, whatever the type of his own man-
ager, the type of the other ￿rm￿ s manager will be the same. The strategic e⁄ect that
in the case of independently distributed types resulted in extra e⁄ort for high types
disappears. The e⁄ort equilibrium conditions for the two types are not interdependent
and the downward distortion on the less e¢ cient manager￿ s e⁄ort has no consequence
on the e⁄ort required to the most e¢ cient one. In this case there is really no interaction
between the contract o⁄ers and the most e¢ cient manager exerts a ￿rst best level of
e⁄ort.
Let￿ s assume then that the joint probability distribution is given by the following:
p1 = Pr
￿
￿i = ￿1 and ￿j = ￿1
￿
, p2 = Pr
￿











￿i = ￿2 and ￿j = ￿1
￿
. We are in presence of positive correlation if ￿ = p1p2￿
b p2
4 > 0.
The following Proposition describes the optimal e⁄ort behavior in presence of correlation.
13Proposition 3 When the type of the manager is known to its own principal and types







9￿2 ￿ 4 + d2 + d + 4￿
9￿1 ￿ 4 + d2 ￿ d + 4￿
where d = p2 ￿ p1.
This expression is always decreasing in ￿ if d > 0 and when d < 0 it is decreasing if
￿￿ > 2
9d.
Proof. Because p1, p2 and
b p
2 are probabilities we can write b p = 1 ￿ p1 ￿ p2 and we can
substitute this expression in ￿ that becomes:
￿ = p1p2 ￿




. Let d = p2 ￿ p1 and substitute in (20):











that can be rewritten as:
4p1 = 4￿ +
￿
d2 + 1 ￿ 2d
￿
In case of correlation, and with the joint probability distribution given above, the
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2(a ￿ c)(9￿1 + 2p1 ￿ b p ￿ 4)
(9￿1 + 2p1 ￿ 4)(9￿2 + 2p2 ￿ 4) ￿ b p2







9￿2 ￿ 4 + d2 + d + 4￿















4[9(￿2 ￿ ￿1) + 2d]
[9￿1 ￿ 4 + d2 ￿ d + 4￿]
2
When d > 0 the above is always negative. Remember that ￿1 < d < 0, so the above
14derivative is negative whenever ￿￿ > 2
9 jdj.
We have seen how positive correlation weakens the strategic e⁄ect described in the
previous section by reducing the e⁄ort di⁄erential. Nonetheless equilibrium e⁄orts re-
main interdependent unless positive correlation is perfect, implying that two way distor-
tions persist once asymmetric information is considered.
When correlation is negative our strategic e⁄ect is reinforced so that the e⁄ort dif-
ferential increases with respect to our main example where types were independently
distributed. Equilibrium interdependence of e⁄orts and two way distortions persist even
when negative correlation is perfect.
7 Contracts with quantity commitments
In this section we analyze contract competition in duopoly when a contract includes not
only a wage and an e⁄ort choice but also an output level for each state of the world.
This is equivalent to the case considered by Martimort (1996) and Piccolo et al. (2008)
in their models with perfectly correlated types. As one would expect, the availability of
a more comprehensive contract reduces the equilibrium e⁄ort but does not change the
qualitative nature of our results: two way distortions remain and no-distortion at the
top disappears.
Consider the model of the previous sections with the di⁄erence that a contract for
a manager of type ￿k with k = 1;2 is now the vector (ei
k;xi
k;wi
k) that speci￿es e⁄ort,
production and wage. In other words the two-stage game is compressed into one stage

































1 ( resp. x
j
2) is the quantity produced by the rival ￿rm when her manager is
e¢ cient (resp. ine¢ cient). The only constraints are the individual rationality ones, as the
manager does not have private information regarding his type but pro￿ts depend from
the unknown type of the other ￿rm￿ s manager. The principal will compute the optimal
contract taking as given the contract of the other ￿rm. The ￿rst order conditions for



























k k = 1;2
The optimal level of e⁄ort happens to be the one that minimizes total costs for any level
of output, in fact once marginal costs are determined together with output decisions the
commitment e⁄ect that was causing ine¢ ciently high e⁄ort disappears.
Since analogous conditions hold for ￿rm j. we can impose symmetry and obtain the
following equilibrium production levels:
x1 =
(a ￿ c) +
p




(a ￿ c) +
p
e2 ￿ ￿ (x1)
2 + 1 ￿ ￿
(23)
These equilibrium conditions show that once quantities are set at the ￿rst (and only)
stage of the game we then have interdependence between the quantity produced by a
￿rm with an e¢ cient manager and that produced a by a ￿rm with an ine¢ cient one.
As the following Proposition shows the property can be found in optimal e⁄ort levels as
well.
Proposition 4 When a contract includes output decisions and each principal can ob-




























2; implying that quantity commitments reduce e⁄ort di⁄er-
entials.
Proof. (24)-(25)are derived by substituting the optimal levels of output in the ￿rst




(a ￿ c)(12￿j ￿ 3)
(12￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ 2)(12￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
for k;j = 1;2











In other words, when contracts are more general and include quantity commitments
the principal ￿nds it optimal to induce lower e⁄ort for both e¢ cient and ine¢ cient
agents. Of course, the lower e⁄ort levels tend to reduce production and increase pro￿ts.
The intuition for these results is once again to be found in the fact that in our basic
two stage setup ￿rms tend to invest too much to commit to a higher production in the
market. Since managers decide how much to produce without taking in consideration the
impact on the rival, this leads to excessive investment ex ante and excessive production
ex post from the point of view of the ￿rms. The more general contract allows ￿rms to
limit this tendency and reduce ￿nal production.
In spite of these di⁄erences in our ￿rst best results, the introduction of asymmetric
information determines the same qualitative results of our basic model. Once each agent
has private information about his type when contracting with his own principal the



























































The following Proposition summarizes our results for the case of quantity commit-
ments in presence of asymmetric information.
Proposition 5 When a contract includes output decisions and principals do not observe



































2 ; meaning that both types exert ine¢ cient levels of
e⁄orts.


































Once we impose the conditions for a symmetric equilibrium: ei
1 = e
j







1 = x1and xi
2 = x
j
2 = x2 we can ￿nd the optimal quantities that are the same
as (22) and (23). If we substitute them in the FOC with respect to the e⁄ort levels we







12~ ￿z ￿ 3
￿
￿
12~ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ 2
￿￿
12~ ￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2
￿
￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
for k;z = 1;2 and k 6= z
where ~ ￿1 = ￿1 and ~ ￿2 = ￿2 + ￿
1￿￿￿￿. Since the virtual type of an ine¢ cient manager is







We have seen that the equilibrium screening contracts are characterized once more
by two way distortions that imply a lower e⁄ort of the ine¢ cient managers and a higher
e⁄ort for e¢ cient ones if compared to the ￿rst best case with symmetric information.
As in the baseline model, the no-distortion at the top property disappears. We can
also make clear statements on the e¢ ciency of the ￿rm once strategic contract o⁄ers
happen in a one stage framework. Since the ￿rst best levels of e⁄ort were also those that
minimized total costs for any level of output, our two way distortion necessarily brings
down the e¢ ciency of each ￿rm, when a hierarchy employs an e¢ cient manager he will
be induced to exert too much e⁄ort while in the case of an ine¢ cient manager e⁄ort will
be too little.
8 Extensions
In this section we brie￿ y examine other forms of competition to verify when this leads
to a two-way distortion. As we will see, this depends on whether the e⁄ort levels are
strategic complements or substitutes.
188.1 Hotelling competition
First, let us consider the case of price competition in a Hotelling model. We assume
￿rms to be located at both ends of the unit segment and consumers, who are uniformly
distributed along this segment, to have utility:
U = max
i
(1 ￿ pi ￿ di) i = 1;2 (29)
where di is the distance from producer i and pi is the price charged by ￿rm i for a unit of
the good. Each ￿rm has marginal cost c￿
p
ei that depends on the e⁄ort of its manager.
At the second stage, once costs are realized and known to everybody, ￿rm i has
demand Di = (1 + pj ￿ pi)=2 and sets prices to maximize its pro￿ts:
￿i =
￿
pi ￿ c +
p
ei
￿ (1 + pj ￿ pi)
2
￿ wi (30)
taking as given the price choice of the rival, and analogously for ￿rm j. The equilibrium
prices are:







i;j = 1;2 (31)


















eiej < 0 (33)
as in our basic model with quantity competition and substitute goods. In the symmetric
information setup, the expected pro￿ts of ￿rm i with a manager of type k = 1;2 can be











































k) is the contract chosen by ￿rm i when its manager is of type ￿k with k =
191;2. The optimal contract maximizes the above expression subject to the participation
constraint wi
k = ￿kei














for k = 1;2


























These two expressions clearly show that the interdependence between the two levels of
e⁄ort is the same as in our baseline model. It is then straightforward to notice that the
impact of asymmetric information is also the same as before. The downward distortion
on the ine¢ cient type￿ s e⁄ort leads to divergence of the e⁄ort levels, with extra e⁄ort for
the most productive type and an additional downward distortion for the least productive

























Therefore, we can suggest that the type of competition in the market does not a⁄ect
the general features of the equilibrium contracts and still present the two way distortion
feature of our main example, what is relevant is how the e⁄ort of the other ￿rm￿ s manager
a⁄ects the expected pro￿t function.
208.2 Cournot competition with complement goods
We now consider the case of quantity competition with complement goods. Assume an
inverse demand function for ￿rm i given by:
pi = a ￿ xi + bxj
where b parametrizes complementarity. The Cournot equilibrium at the second stage
when the two ￿rms have managers who exert e⁄orts ei and ej prescribes that each ￿rm
i produces the following output:
xi =





(2 ￿ b)(2 + b)
for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j (39)
that generates the second stage pro￿t function below ￿i = ￿(ei;ej) ￿ wi with:
￿(ei;ej) =
"





(2 ￿ b)(2 + b)
#2
for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j (40)
The above equation shows that in this case we have strategic complementarity between
e⁄orts and each ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts depend positively from both e⁄orts.
When each principal observes the type of his own manager, the expected pro￿ts of
￿rm i with a manager of type k = 1;2 can be expressed as the weighted average of the












k) is the contract chosen by ￿rm i when its manager is of type ￿k with



















k [(2 ￿ b)(2 + b)]
2 ￿ 4
(42)
for k = 1;2.
In presence of asymmetric information regarding his own manager￿ s type, each prin-
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that is expected pro￿t across four states of the world subject to the individual rationality
and incentive compatibility constraints for the manager as seen previously.
In this case, when products traded at the second stage are complement goods, the








~ ￿1 [(2 ￿ b)(2 + b)]









~ ￿2 [(2 ￿ b)(2 + b)]
2 ￿ 4 ￿ 2(1 ￿ v)b
(44)
where ~ ￿k is the virtual type of a manager of type k. When the type of each manager
is not observed by his principal ~ ￿2 = ￿2 + v
1￿v￿￿, and the level of e⁄ort is lower than






2 . The level of e⁄ort required from an







To verify this, notice that taking the ￿rst order conditions (42) and imposing sym-
metry conditions on level of e⁄orts allows us to derive the equilibrium conditions above.
In the asymmetric information case an informational rent has to be paid to the e¢ cient
manager and it distorts downward the level of e⁄ort of the ine¢ cient manager. The pos-
itive relation between the two level of e⁄orts implies that also the e⁄ort for the e¢ cient
manager will be distorted downward.
The key aspect of this model is that, contrary to the previous models, the e⁄ort





eiej > 0 (45)
This means that a higher e⁄ort of one manager increases the marginal pro￿tability of
the other ￿rms. In such a case, both ￿rms tend to implement more similar contracts
(there is less to gain from e⁄ort from a good manager that is more likely to meet a
bad one) with low e⁄ort, which softens competition increasing costs and pro￿ts. We do
22not observe two way distortions in this setup, nonetheless the no-distortion at the top
property is absent also in this case.
The result that complement goods somehow reversed the direction of the strategic
e⁄ect is present (although in di⁄erent ways) also in most of the previous work that studied
strategic contract o⁄ers as, for example, Martimort [1996], Brainard and Martimort
[1996] and in a two stages setup Brander and Spencer [1983].
8.3 Contract competition with advertising e⁄ort
Consider the same market as in the baseline example where e⁄ort produces demand
enhancing activities, as advertising, that increase total demand and in particular the
demand of the ￿rm investing in these activities. In particular, assume an inverse demand:





where X is total quantity and b < 1. Given two contracts (ei;wi) and (ej;wj), ￿rm i
obtains the pro￿ts:




ej ￿ xi ￿ xj)xi ￿ cxi ￿ wi (46)
where c is the now constant marginal cost, ei and ej represent the amount of advertising.
The idea is that both types of advertising increase demand, but own advertising has a
stronger e⁄ect than the rival￿ s one.
At the second stage, once advertising investments have been made and are public,
￿rms set quantities taking as given the quantity of the other ￿rm. The optimal quantity
choice is given by:
xi =
a ￿ c + (2 ￿ b)
p
ei + (2b ￿ 1)pej
3
for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j
As a consequence the ￿rst stage pro￿ts, as a function of advertising e⁄orts, become






a ￿ c + (2 ￿ b)
p




this expression depends positively in both ￿rm￿ s advertising e⁄ort, meaning that we are
facing another case of strategic complements as in our previous example of complement
23goods:
￿12(ei;ej) =
(2 ￿ b)(2b ￿ 1)
6peiej
> 0 (47)
In the symmetric information setup, the expected pro￿ts of ￿rm i with a manager
of type k = 1;2 can be expressed as the weighted average of the pro￿ts obtained when
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k) is the contract chosen by ￿rm i when its manager is of type ￿k with k =
1;2. The optimal contract maximizes the above expression subject to the participation
constraint wi
k = ￿kei
















9￿k ￿ (2 ￿ b)
2 for k = 1;2 (49)
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9￿2 ￿ (2 ￿ b)
2 ￿ (2 ￿ b)(2b ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
i (51)
These conditions show that the ￿rst-best e⁄ort levels in our model with demand en-
hancing advertising are interdependent like in our example with complement goods, the
amount of advertising required from an e¢ cient manager depend positively on the e⁄ort
required from an ine¢ cient one.
Once we introduce asymmetric information inside the hierarchy, the downward dis-
tortion in the ine¢ cient manager￿ s e⁄ort due to the informational rent that has to be
paid to the e¢ cient type will cause a downward distortion in the more e¢ cient manager￿ s
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￿ (2 ￿ b)
2 ￿ (2 ￿ b)(2b ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
i (53)
and it is immediate to see that, although the no distortion at the top property is still
not present, both e⁄orts are downward distorted.
In conclusion, whenever e⁄orts are strategic complements their equilibrium levels
will be downward distorted with respect to the ￿rst best for all types. Therefore, the
kind of strategic interactions between the e⁄orts of the managers (and not the kind of
competition) leads to di⁄erent consequences on the equilibrium contracts.
9 Conclusions
In this work we have analyzed the choice of incentive contracts by ￿rms that operated in
an imperfectly competitive product market. The main result is that, due to a strategic
e⁄ect in contract o⁄ers, the no distortion at the top, present in standard screening
models, disappears. A two way distortion becomes optimal in our main model, when
types are correlated, when the game is one stage and when there is spatial competition,
all situations in which agent￿ s e⁄orts are strategic substitutes from the point of view
of the principal. When e⁄orts are strategic complements their optimal level is always
downward distorted, even for the highest type.
We believe our work has o⁄ered two novel insights. First, we have contributed to
the literature on competing hierarchies in identifying a new channel through which com-
petition may a⁄ect incentive provision. Second, we have contributed to the more general
contract theory literature in showing a new reason, beyond countervailing incentives and
production externalities, for having a two way distortion.
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